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ABSTRACT 
The rise of the threat of WMD attack on American soil necessitates new and 
innovative approaches to homeland security.  A layered security model has been 
proposed in which an attacker must successfully penetrate multiple defensive constructs 
in order to complete an attack.  As part of a layered defensive approach, a network of 
sensor equipped vehicles operating in urban traffic is considered.  To-date, sensor 
packages have been developed for vehicles without detailed, area-specific analysis of 
their aggregate performance measures.  The possible effectiveness of this network of 
sensors in detecting vehicle based WMD attacks is explored in this thesis. 
A Discrete Event Simulation using actual roadmap data was developed and 
analyzed to explore various configurations for searcher employment and in particular to 
generate a potential return on investment curve in the form of probability of detection 
generated as a function of the number of sensor equipped vehicles.  The baseline scenario 
centers on an attacker utilizing a vehicle-mounted WMD device.  The attacker attempts a 
shortest-path route from a randomly selected starting point to a downtown target node.  
Patrol vehicles are equipped with sensors that can identify potential attacker vehicles in 
the adjacent lane of oncoming traffic.  These vehicles patrol the roadway network, and 
are assumed to foil an attack when they detect an attack vehicle.  The simulation model 
outputs data such as the proportion of foiled attacks and the distance from target, given a 
detection. 
An analysis of performance encompassing the greater Washington D. C. area to 
include over 620 square miles of urban and suburban roadway systems is conducted.  
Detector deployment in random search patterns in this roadway network yields an 
appreciable deterrent of greater than 10% probability of detection only when more than 
200 patrolling agents are assigned.  More optimized employment schemes, 
countermeasures, and counter-countermeasures are discussed in addition to other 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
An exploration of the potential effectiveness of vehicle mounted mobile WMD 
detectors is conducted via simulation.  A simulation model was developed that combines 
actual roadway data from geo-spatial data sources and discrete event simulation to 
analyze encounter and detection dynamics in an urban environment.  The urban area of 
study is Washington D.C. and surrounding counties out to a few miles beyond the 
beltway, encompassing approximately 620 square miles of urban and dense suburban 
road networks.  Various experimental design points are inspected, with specific interest 
on the return on investment (in the form of probability of detection) depicted as a curve 
generated by increasing numbers of configured vehicles. 
The model is an application of a basic searcher-detector scheme in which many 
sensor equipped searcher vehicles patrol city streets in an effort to intercept periodic 
attacks on a high value target area in the center of the city.  Sensor vehicles are randomly 
moving, non-intelligent patrol vehicles without assigned patterns or patrol beats.  
Penetration by the attacker from outside the area of regard to the outer perimeter of the 
D.C. beltway is assumed.  Attackers, having breached other defensive layers and arrived 
in the periphery of the city, start attack runs from random points in the vicinity of the 
beltway and seek a shortest path to the area of the Capitol.  Detectors on patrol vehicles 
are purposefully generic with extremely limited range, and only have the ability to screen 
vehicles in adjacent, opposite direction traffic on the same road segment.  The generic, 
limited range detectors modeled are similar in capability to field tested nuclear detectors 
and results generated are transferable to other similar sensor configurations. 
The effect of penalizing attacker travel on expressways or highways on their 
attack run is also explored.  This penalization reflects a defensive scheme in which the 
express routes are overtly patrolled through some other means.  In this scheme, the 
attackers are strongly discouraged from using the expressway as part of an attack route, 
and are effectively forced “onto city streets,” where they are more readily detected by 
actual physical devices while in motion. 
 xvi
The intentionally generic sensor modeled generates results that are more 
accurately labeled as encounter probabilities.  The probability of encounter results 
generated by the model are intended to support a bridge to a more developed physics 
model of detection and a detailed traffic model capable of arbitrating the intercept of a 
detected vehicle.  To support further exploration of detection and pursuit/interdiction, 
other measures of effectiveness are presented, including the distribution of intercepts by 
road speed category and the distance and time remaining on an attack run at time of 
intercept. 
Searcher allocations of less than 50 produce less than a 5% probability of 
encounter, while allocations of 400 searchers produces an approximate 20% probability 
of an encounter.  Although small, these statistics do represent an appreciable barrier and 
credible deterrent within a layered defense model against singular, extraordinary attacks.  
Mobile detectors additionally provide focused screening power inside territorial borders, 
can augment fixed screening processes in the event of an escalated threat, and provide 






A. THE CHALLENGES OF WMD THREATS 
The coupling of advanced technology, extremist ideologies, and global 
interconnectivity have presented a tremendous challenge to open societies and their 
populations in the form of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats.  Since the 
dawn of the nuclear era, weaponry capable of producing damage on an unthinkable scale 
has advanced and proliferated in many areas of the world.  It is widely accepted that it is 
more likely that free societies will face an increased threat from these weapons as 
political and social tensions embolden our enemies.  The magnitude of destruction that 
these weapons bring in possible loss of human life, destruction to the fabric of our 
economy, and their potential to alter the course of the nation require extraordinary means 
to prevent their development, transport, and use. 
This thesis is principally an exploration of one aspect of that defensive structure.  
The overarching goal supported is the hardening of homeland defenses and furthering of 
the exploration of smart and agile structures which decrease the probability that defensive 
layers will be penetrated by a willing and dedicated attacker.   
Threat capabilities are truly large.  Devastation of even a one or two square mile 
section out of an urban area could have a human cost measured in the hundreds of 
thousands.  Destructive capabilities of this magnitude must be met with extraordinary 
effort and will require smart, yet extensive devotion of material, personnel, and research 
effort.  Contrarily, budgets for defense are not unlimited and must be wisely apportioned 
to counter numerous potential threats over vast geospatial environments.  Military 
offensive operations can be focused on generation sources of chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weaponry if the target can be identified and “fixed” to a location.  The effort to 
extend offensive operations to eliminate these threats at the source has obvious 
limitations in the forms of accurate intelligence and pervasive battle-space access 
culminating in the ability to hit a fixed a target.  Therefore, offensive operations will 
never suffice as an effective security measure in and of themselves.  Defensive 
structuring is arguably more difficult, most notably due to the fact that there is really no 
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margin for error.  Additionally, the diversity of threats and their compact size present 
additional problems.  Finally, the sheer volume of goods and materiel transported through 
the global trade network by air, sea, rail and truck make screening of cargo for small, 
lethal devices particularly challenging.  The clear challenge is to match and exceed the 
offensive ingenuity of prospective terror agents with proactive, clever security measures 
in a cost efficient manner. 
B. LAYERED SECURITY APPROACH 
Structuring defensive measures in an open, actively trading society is a daunting 
challenge.  The idea of enforcing an “impenetrable security barrier” is an attractive 
paradigm, but fails on further exploration.  Securing even one mode of entry with a near 
100% screening process is untenable.  Consider, for example, maritime container 
transport.  Within this network, we have almost certain control over the location of the 
points of entry—the same cannot be easily stated for vehicle or airborne traffic—at our 
numerous major shipping ports, but the challenge of matching the volume of traffic with a 
100% screening effort is unachievable.  Consider, for example, an exemplar of the newer 
class of container ships, the Emma Maersk, which is capable of delivering 11,000 
standard 20-foot container shipments in a single visit (Maersk Line 2007).  Erecting 
screening facilities to match this capacity with pervasive scanning and detection 
mechanisms is currently infeasible without extracting a high economic cost on 
transportation and economic infrastructure.  Air and vehicular points of entry are faced 
with similar challenges which are exacerbated by the more numerous points of 
debarkation, yet are clearly not as challenged in volumetric terms. 
A layered approach to providing security beyond points of entry is much more 
tenable.  The addition of random screening or randomly patrolling agents is an attractive 
addition to any fixed pattern of defense.  An attacker planning a singular attack, such as a 
WMD detonation, will likely have a plan to circumvent static, overt screening methods.  
Random patrol, unannounced roadside screening, and other similar tactics are much more 
difficult to defeat through detailed attack planning, and present a distinct advantage to the 
defender.  The defensive power of the strategy of employing a layered approach to 
securing borders is bolstered by the power of compounding independent probabilistic 
events, and allows much more flexibility of implementation.  For reasons outlined 
3 
previously, no layer in the defensive structure would be designed for a 100% screening 
effort, but rather with the intent to make a substantial contribution to a progressive 
defensive model that in total, provides a very high confidence defensive structure.  This 
structure should (and currently does) have an overseas component in the form of point-
of-embarkation screening, a point of debarkation screening effort, and should be 
augmented with smart and flexible deterrence and screening efforts within the United 
States and other concerned nations.  A prospective attacker would need to penetrate each 
layer of security independently, and the cumulative probability of success diminishes 
greatly with a well-layered structure.  This structure is depicted in Figure 1.  Both 
security structures depicted, the single layer and the multi-layer, have the same 
probability of defeating an attack.  The multi-layer approach states that a threat device 
has a 0.30 probability of being detected at embarkation point, a 0.40 probability of being 
detected at debarkation, etc.  Despite the low likelihood of detection at each stage, an 
attack would need to successfully navigate all wickets in order to execute. 
 
Figure 1. Single Layer Security vs. Multi-Layer Approach 
 
Layering the approach to security has numerous additional merits.  First, it is not 
inconceivable that a WMD threat could be manufactured, stolen, or assembled from 
innocuous sub-assemblies within the United States.  An over-investment in border 
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security would empower the attacker in this scenario.  Having already penetrated the 
single defensive layer at the border, he would enjoy extreme freedom of movement.  
Structuring defensive capabilities within our borders to provide some layer of screening 
and search is required to address such scenarios.  Additionally, large, fixed, highly 
structured security measures are poorly matched against patient, smart adversaries.  
Borders are routinely tunneled under, fixed patrol patterns are observed and defeated, and 
trial events are staged to probe vulnerabilities.  An attacker who has one opportunity to 
stage an entry into a target area with WMD will make a concerted effort to defeat 
standing security measures.  A layered approach, augmented with a mobile detection 
element, employs forces and screening devices that can inject a degree of 
unpredictability, which can be a force multiplier against singular attempts at entry.  For 
example, a roving sentry who randomly reverses course along a large fence line will 
certainly not provide a guarantee of success against an overpowering attack force, but can 
provide a very formidable challenge to a small element seeking covert entry.  Contrarily, 
if the sentry routinely walks the entire fence line in a predictable fashion, his observable 
mode of operation is easily defeated by a patient adversary. 
In summary, with respect to screening models, it is clear that an investment in a 
single “impenetrable” layer at points of entry is not the optimal approach.  Although 
fixed location screening sites and patterns of surveillance are certainly necessary, 
significant performance is gained by augmenting with mobile or deployable elements and 
further enhanced with stochastic screening methods wherever possible. 
C. MOBILE DETECTION 
The ability to screen for WMD threats from a mobile platform is an excellent 
augmentation to a layered security approach.  Mobile units have multiple utilization 
modes and can make a sizeable contribution to an overall security umbrella.  They can be 
deployed after an intelligence lead on a specific location to form a screening perimeter 
capable of scanning inbound and outbound traffic to the quarantined zone, augment fixed 
security screening facilities on a road network during high-demand screening efforts, or 
they can perform independent screening operations in likely threat locations.  This thesis 
focuses on the potential benefit of an investment in mobile screening technology—
specifically nuclear threat detection by vehicle-born detectors.  Such detectors are 
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currently operational and have credible detection capabilities against other moving 
vehicles.  The conclusions of this thesis are not constrained to nuclear threat detection 
studies.  This model can be applied to a similar screening layer for many other types of 
threats.  The conclusions are applicable to any mobile detector scheme as long as key 
underlying assumptions on detector performance match. 
For the purposes of the study, a major metropolitan area is selected along with 
adjacent counties that encompass a geographic subset of the roadway system appropriate 
in scale for WMD attack study.  The city at the heart of the map is provided the defensive 
capability presented by the mobile detectors.  As previously stated, these detectors have 
multiple employment modes, but only the contribution gained in random patrol mobile 
screening is presently considered.  The scheme of employment is to configure a fixed 
number of generic patrol vehicles with detection devices and allow them to screen road 
traffic while either parked or driving within the roadway structure contained in the map.  
The attacking agent in the model is a vehicle equipped with a generic threat device.  
This thesis focuses on the dynamics of individual attack runs by the attacking 
agents and their potential interactions within networks of deployed mobile sensors.  In 
this baseline study, the attack runs commence at a fixed distance away from the target.  
Attacks proceed along a shortest path route to the target, where shortest path is 
determined by driving time without consideration for traffic.  Searchers in the model have 
no pre-knowledge of the attack in progress or its origin.  Their movement is random 
within the geographic area of regard (AOR) in the model.   
D. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
The area of exploration of this model is to define the effectiveness of this network 
of mobile detectors.  Specifically, the aim is to develop a performance model that can be 
used to help define a cost-benefit relationship for an investment in this type of security 
mechanism.  Can 50 vehicle-mounted sensors provide a credible layer of protection or 
deterrence against a vehicle born nuclear threat?  Can 200?  Clearly, the probability of 
encounter and detection are inextricably linked to the underlying road structure, 
capabilities of the sensor, and nature of the threat device.  An exploration of the physics 
of nuclear detectors and sensing is beyond the scope and classification level of this paper, 
but a thorough investigation into the encounter dynamics is presented.  An “encounter” is 
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defined to be an interaction between a searcher and the attacker in which a detection is 
possible.  The encounter dynamics are the necessary sub-structure to support a more 
detailed investigation of detection declaration and interdiction. 
Data specific to the nature of the encounter will be of critical importance to 
determining the likelihood of a credible detection.  A generic nuclear detector may have 
sensing capabilities against various threats out to a range of only a few meters and require 
a short, yet non-negligible dwell time for sensing to occur.  Therefore, characteristics of 
the road network such as speed limits and lane counts (and resultant road width) are 
required to step from an encounter model into a detection model.  Dwell time can be 
extrapolated from assumptions about closest point of approach (CPA) and closure 
velocity between two vehicles moving in opposite directions.  Lane count in two 
directions will underscore a probabilistic model for the range of the encounter.  A 
detector with a theoretical 2-meter detection capability may not be likely to detect a threat 
on an urban street across four lanes of traffic, but would most certainly be effective if the 
encounter occurred on a 2-lane road. 
E. PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO MODELING 
The area of exploration in the model is a random search approach to detecting a 
mobile attacker.  Various random search algorithms exist for open fields of movement 
and are widely studied and used in anti-submarine warfare and ocean surface search 
(Wagner et al. 1999, 181).  The underlying cumulative probability of detection 
formulation in these models has the functional form 
Fd(t) = 1 - ekt 
where Fd(t) is the cumulative probability of detection and k is a function of sensor scan 
width and velocity.  This model is difficult to justify in an urban environment because of 
the constrained set of movements (a network of roads, bridges, tunnels and highways) 
and the attacker’s traversal through the network during the search. 
A more applicable approach utilizes Markov chain analysis of the AOR.  This 
approach discretizes potential locations within the road network and analyzes movement 
between nodes as Markov state transitions (Edmunds 1994).  This approach has the 
advantage of representing attacker movement through the AOR and is a more accurate 
7 
representation of searcher movement.  Searcher direction changes occur as state 
transitions between states in the Markov matrix, which more accurately represents turn 
choices at intersections.   
The principal shortfall of this approach is the challenge of dimensioning of the 
Markov matrix to properly represent the search grid and the discrete steps the attacker 
and searchers take.  Edmunds takes an approach of this type in analyzing attacker 
penetration into the center of an urban area in an initial analysis of potential benefits of 
mobile detectors in the Washington D. C. area (Edmunds et al. 2006).  Although this 
effort advances an understanding of the dynamics of the city street search problem, it 
makes assumptions as to the construction of the search grid and physical relationships 
inherent to the actual road network.  It is well suited for grid-like city constructs, but fails 
to adequately model expressways, circuitous street constructs, and suburban road 
structuring in general. 
F. INTRODUCTION OF THE ROAD NETWORK MODEL 
A review of prior work suggests that an accounting of actual road networks 
generates better detection models.  Dense urban grids, bridges, expressways, and 
encircled subdivisions challenged by linear road connections suggest that the underlying 
geometry and traffic flow designs must be accounted for in model construction. 
When reviewing an attack model to explore urban penetration, the origin of the 
attack and the possible detection zones should be considered to determine a suitable 
radius to circumscribe the AOR.  The model developed in this thesis centers on urban 
defense, and presupposes the transportation of a threat device to within reasonable 
striking distance of the target.  Excluded from the model are suburban areas of 
extraordinary distance from the attack target and, in general, the interstate highway 
system connecting the remainder of the country.  Bounding the AOR is necessary to 
contain the motion of the patrol vehicles.  The model developed is a discrete event 
simulation that uses actual road network information. 
Chapter II will explore the model utilized and include a discussion of key 
assumptions and of discrete event simulation in general terms.  Chapter III will cover 
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results and observations and Chapter IV will cover possible performance enhancements, a 
discussion of countermeasures, and possible extensions to the model schema. 
9 
II. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The basic construction of the model is detailed and explored.  The model utilizes 
a unique blend of data describing the actual physical structure of the road network and 
discrete event simulation.  Geospatial data is parsed and transformed into a graph 
structure.  The resultant graph in node-arc format is used as the basis of the motion model 
in the discrete event simulation.  A more detailed description of the implementation is 
provided as well as a discussion of independent variables and governing assumptions. 
A. MERGING OF DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION AND GEOSPATIAL 
DATA 
The inextricable linkage of the problem statement to the geographically defined 
characteristics of the AOR suggests that simulation rather than closed-form mathematical 
analysis is the course to pursue.  The underlying structure of an urban road transportation 
network is uniquely characterized by civic design to include bridges, expressways, one-
way routings, divided road structures, and other such civil-engineering constructs that 
will uniquely determine the probability of encounter between two entities moving within 
the network.  Furthermore, should two entities encounter or sense each other, the 
outcome of the interaction, whether it be a detection, detection failure, or false detection, 
will be driven in part by the speed of closure between the two and the separation at time 
of passage, both of which are determined by the underlying road structure.  These 
complexities are challenging to incorporate into an analytic model.  The reliance on 
actual data for road networks requires the introduction of geospatial data. 
The use of geospatial data conveys many benefits.  Consider two examples which 
illustrate some of the core advantages.  In an urban area that is dominated by one-way 
street routings, a moving detector may have very little opportunity to encounter another 
moving target if both were in the same flow of traffic simply due to the lack of opposing 
traffic on the streets.  However, if the roadways entering the target area were 
predominately two-way streets, the chances would be much improved.  Other geospatial 
challenges are easily tackled by actual data.  A city with significant sprawl encompassing 
dense suburban neighborhoods will generate different patrol results than would a city 
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with more direct highway access, less dense adjoining suburbs, or one that is 
geographically constrained by a coastline, for instance. 
Discrete event simulation (DES) was selected as the exploratory tool to model 
movement within the road network and interaction of the entities therein.  Briefly, 
discrete event simulation maps distinct changes in the state of an object into discrete 
events that happen during the simulation.  As a matter of implementation, as an entity 
enters a particular road segment its location state is altered by the event of selecting or 
proceeding on a particular segment.  It is under this construct that movement is modeled 
on the road network. 
B. GEOSPATIAL DATA AND CONVERSION TO USEABLE FORMAT 
Geospatial data is a mathematical representation of physical structures with 
geographic specificity.  This form of data is widely used in many contexts.  For instance 
digital terrain elevation data feeds numerous flight simulation engines in order to 
reproduce terrain elevations in virtual worlds.  Road and rail networks have been 
painstakingly converted (by mapping agencies) into geographic coordinate networks in 
order to support routing programs and interactive mapping tools such as many internet 
mapping websites, quickest route tools, and GPS backed routing devices.  Datasets to 
support these tools and operations are available both commercially and through websites 
such as the National Atlas (National Atlas 2007).  This thesis utilizes a commercially 
available dataset (NAVSTREETS v3.3.0) for roads and highways in the continental 
United States in the widely utilized “shapefile” (.shp) format.  This data format separates 
roadways into individual segments, divided at every intersection, that are tagged with a 
multitude of descriptive data including speed categorization, direction of travel 
(applicable to 1-way streets), postal coding, street naming, etc.  Similar datasets are 
routinely used for mapping programs to compute driving directions or produce maps in 
specified areas of interest. 
1. GeoTools Open Source Library 
In order to utilize descriptive road data for simulation, conversion into a format 
suitable for the simulation engine is required.  The DES engine in this case is a Java-
based program constructed to run on a graph (node, arc) structure.  The means to render a 
useable graph network data structure from raw geospatial data is embedded in numerous 
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commercial routing packages, but is also available in open-source format through various 
open-source Java libraries.  GeoTools provides such methodology and it was selected as 
the analytical tool to enable this simulation (GeoTools Project, 2006).  The GeoTools 
library provides an array of Java-based implements to analyze, plot, catalog, and 
manipulate geospatial data from various input formats. 
2. Dataset Conversion 
A graph-generating Java Class derived from GeoTools converts Shapefile street 
data into road network graphs in node-arc format.  This generating scheme utilizes a 
graph-building algorithm that converts the raw geo-spatial locating data, in the form of 
coordinate arrays, to produce a useable node-arc structure divorced from actual geospatial 
coordinates (latitude-longitude).  This process produces a graph that has a node for each 
intersection in the actual network.  The baseline code of this conversion program was 
substantially modified to enable the creation of directed arcs to reflect actual direction of 
travel on the arcs produced, which is essential in representing realistic traffic flows.  The 
production of distinct nodes for geospatially distinct artifacts is critical to understanding 
how the simulation will handle intersections and opposite direction traffic, specifically on 
divided roads.  Road segments labeled as bi-directional that are represented by an array 
of coordinates will produce two arcs (one for each direction of travel) between the two 
nodes at opposite ends of the same street segment.  However, when roads are divided by 
a significant median, and represented by two distinct coordinate arrays, they are rendered 
as individual arcs between independent node sets without an opposing edge.  This is the 
norm for divided highways or expressways, and can be implemented in roadways with 
very wide medians.  For purposes of the model, no interaction may occur across such a 
divide.  The potential for interactions exists only on opposing arcs between node sets that 
are geographically equal on both ends of a street segment.  This relationship and the 
translation of road data into graph data is depicted in Figure 2.  The underlying construct 
in which a sensor has a very limited lateral range curve supports the simulation 
consequence of excluding interaction across large medians.  Considering the geometry of 
Figure 2, a vehicle traveling west on Main St. would be unable to sense a vehicle 
traveling east on Main St..  However, vehicles traveling in opposite directions on Tree St. 
between 2nd and 3rd Avenues could detect each other. 
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Weighting of edges in the constructed graph is implemented in order to distill 
travel times and facilitate computations to support attacker shortest path routing.  The 
edges are weighted with a baseline travel time generated by a summation of the geodetic 
calculations of length of all included segments and dividing by the speed categorization 
of the road segment. 
 
Figure 2. Conversion of shapefile street data into graph (node, arc) format 
 
Trimming the graph to characterize operations within one specific geographic 
area is a subjective process.  As stated previously, an attack route is assumed to start 
outside the metropolitan area and makes its way to a centrally located node.  The tailored 
area should reflect reasonable inclusion/exclusion decisions on affected patrol areas 
(districts, counties, police jurisdictions, etc.).  In a subjective look at the principal AOR 
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analyzed, the D.C. beltway serves as a reasonable geospatial reference by which to sever 
the simulation model from the entire U. S. road network.  The resulting map is depicted 
in Figure 3.  Potential starting nodes for an attack are generated with a geometric distance 


























Figure 3. AOR processed by simulation:  Washington, D.C. 
Red road segments represent 458 distinct possible attack starting locations on a 10 mile 
radius from the Capitol.  The D.C. Beltway (I-495) is encircled and is visible and roughly 
concurrent with the east and west portions of the attack ring. 
 
 
C. FUNCTIONAL FLOW OF THE PROGRAM 
Prior to running the DES, the dataset is converted and the model is initialized.  
These steps are enumerated in Table 1. 
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Stage Functional Task 
1. Load geospatial dataset.  This dataset is a pre-trimmed shapefile (.shp) with a feature set 
exclusively consisting of roadways in the AOR 
2. Label the “target” node in the network, and a “home base” for searchers to reset to. 
3. Geographically filter the dataset to produce a set of intersected arcs to serve as potential 
starting nodes for an attack.  This is accomplished by a circular intersection filter that 
gathers any road segment that intersects a circular polygon set to a diameter of 95% of the 
minimum rectangular dimension of the map. 
4. Convert the geospatial data (roads with arrays of Lat-Long coordinates to describe their 
position on the Earth) to Graph (node, arc) format.  One-way streets are implemented as 
directed arcs based on annotated direction of travel.  Standard two-way streets are entered 
twice, once with geometry reversed in order to produce opposing arcs between the same two 
nodes.  Weight the edges by travel time developed from a curvilinear length calculation and 
the speed category of the road. 
5. All graph nodes are screened by reaching and reverse reaching algorithms to develop sets of 
unreachable (U) and “isolated” (I) nodes, s.t.: 
U = { nodes cannot be navigated to from the home base } 
I = { nodes that do not have a path back to home base }  
6. Remove any nodes from the starting location set that are a member of set I.  Then, use 
Dijkstra’s algorithm to generate and cache shortest paths from all potential attack origins to 
the target node. 
Table 1. Functional flow of program before to simulation run. 
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Handling of special case nodes is extremely important to control undesirable 
behavior within the simulation.  To support categorization of problem nodes, reaching 
and reverse-reaching algorithms are employed to label nodes within the dataset.  Problem 
nodes are categorized as either unreachable or as isolated.  Unreachable nodes are not 
accessible by any path from the home base.  Isolated nodes have no path returning them 
to the home base.  Both are frequently created as a byproduct of trimming an urban 
subset graph from the larger road network.  Odd subdivisions or divided highways can 
produce multiple problem nodes, depending on location of cut set.  For example, in the 
simple network from Figure 2, if Node B is the base node then Node I is unreachable and 
Node M is isolated.   
Basic statistics for the Washington D. C. Graph are presented in Table 2.  It is 
implied at initialization that the home base node and target node are strongly connected, 
i.e., that each can be reached from the other.  Handling the inadvertent placement on or 
entry to an unreachable or isolated node is discussed in the motion control of each entity. 
 
Graph Characteristic Set Size 
Directed Edges 200,487 
Unreachable Nodes 306 
Isolated Nodes 301 
Attack start nodes at 10mi radius 458 
Table 2. Graph Statistics:  Washington D. C. 
 
 
D. DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION FUNCTIONALITY 
1. Core Movement and Movement Management 
The DES phase of the model is run subsequent to the preparation steps described 
in Table 1.  The functional flow of the simulation is more thoroughly detailed in the 
Event Graphs which follow. 
The DES is conceived and run within SimKit, a Java-based discrete event 
simulation development library (SimKit, 2007).  Within SimKit distinct simulation 
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entities are embedded with process logic, and are capable of scheduling events on a 
master schedule.  Entities within the simulation are capable of interacting with other 
entities by triggering events for each other through a “Sim Event listener” pattern 
supported within SimKit (Buss and Sanchez, 2002).  
The basic construct of the simulation is that an entity (either a searcher or 
attacker) is assigned to a mover that is capable of traversing edges in the graph created.  
The mover’s actions are dictated by a manager that assigns its next move based on 
management type (by path or random motion).  Managers get their instruction from a 
controlling entity; which is an attack instigator, or in the case of the search team a search 
leader.  The basic schema for both a mover and a manager are reproduced in Figures 4 
and 5. 
 
Figure 4. Graph Mover:  Basic Schema for both searcher and attacker entities. 
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MoverManager
- Basic Schema -
(subtype)
AttackerMoverManager
Manager has a path
(subtype)
RandomSearchManager
































Figure 5. Mover Managers:  Basic Schema largely shared.  Differences between 
searcher and attacker are as noted 
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2. Sensing and Arbitration 
A mediator element is instantiated to adjudicate detections between the moving 
elements and arbitrate interactions.  The Mediator event graph is depicted in Figure 6.  
The mediator monitors the positions of all searchers and of the attacker.  Each time any 
mover element enters a new edge on the graph, its position is updated and all edges in 
opposite direction between the same two nodes (there should be no more than one) are 
inventoried for the opposite type entity.  If an attacker is present on an opposite direction 
edge when a searcher enters an edge, an arbitration is scheduled.  If, by chance, multiple 
searchers are present, each interaction is arbitrated until a kill is declared. 
In the current model a perfect sensor is assumed, therefore every encounter within 
detection radius is declared a detection, and nominally an interdiction.  Thus, the model 
as developed is an encounter model.  All encounters are currently detections and are 
declared kills administratively.  The physics model necessary to convert closure velocity 
and lane separation into dwell time, sensing distance, and subsequent detection rates over 
numerous threat types would bring this paper into higher security classification levels, 
and is therefore left as a suggested extension.  Another alternative would be to model 
detection and interdiction using probability distributions in place of detailed physics 
models.  In either case, the core factors that would empower a more complete detection 
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  patrolledEdgeCache.remove(edge, searcher)
if(attacker)
  attackerLocation.setNull()








3. Assembling the Model with Listeners 
As stated, the model is connected via Sim Event listener patterns.  Upper level 
entities direct the action of lower level movers and receive feedback should an intercept 
occur.  The number of searchers is determined by instantiation routines and can be varied 






































at start of run
General Listener Pattern
(All communication is 2-way, primary flow is depicted)
 




Each attack is an independent stochastic replication.  Sources of randomness in 
the run are: 
• Searcher location prior to start of run.  All edges in the graph are 
enumerated, and all searchers are randomly re-assigned prior to the 
commencement of each run. 
• Random selection of the attack start node from among the eligible start 
set. 
• Searcher movement on the map driven by random outbound segment 
selection at each intersection. 
• Searcher break-taking interval and duration is randomized by a uniform 
random variable with reasonable limits. 
 
4. Searcher Movement 
Searchers are initialized at the beginning of every attack run.  The initialization 
process uses a random number generator to assign each searcher to a random starting arc 
within the AOR.  Specialized handling after initialization is only required if the searcher 
wanders into an isolated area (characterized by nodes that have no return routing to the 
home base).  In this instance, the searcher is reset to the home base.  This results in a very 
minor increase in searcher density near home base, which is reasonable, if not an 
underestimation of patrol effort near the “headquarters.”  The home base currently 
employed in the Washington, D.C. model is a few miles north of the Capitol, which is the 
target. 
Searcher movement within the network is random after an attack run commences.  
No pre-defined routing or intelligent patrol algorithm is implemented.  At each node 
(intersection), the searcher simply “rolls the dice” to determine which segment to enter.  
Currently, a no U-turn algorithm is employed.  The no U-turn algorithm precludes the 
searcher from selecting an arc that would return him to his previous departure node 
unless it is the only option available (as in the case of a dead-end street.)  While a real 
searcher vehicle may employ U-turns occasionally, it is postulated that no U-turns is a 
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much more realistic assumption that will:  (a) provide more forward motion to search 
components, (b) result in a searcher with less “jitter” in his routing, (c) prevent a 
completely random searcher from making a U-turn probabilistically every  four blocks on 
average, assuming  four-way intersections. 
Searchers periodically take breaks, as all patrolling entities are apt to do.  
Scanning by the searcher during break continues on the arc that he commences his break 
on.  Currently, the scan only includes one direction of travel, exactly as if he were in 
motion.  This is, again, a reasonable extension of the pretense of a limited range scanning 
device that may only be able to “see” into one adjacent lane.  Currently breaks occur for 
each searcher independently on a uniform random interval [0.2, 1.0] hrs.  The duration of 
a break, once it occurs is scheduled for a duration by a random uniform variable between 
[0.5, 1.0] hrs. 
5. Attacker Movement 
Attackers are instantiated within the simulation and are given a Dijkstra-generated 
shortest path route to the target.  They proceed from node to node along each arc of the 
assigned path to eventually arrive at the target, unless they are detected and removed.  All 
entities within the simulation travel “at the speed limit” annotated by the speed category 
for their present location based on the assumption that they would not wish to attract the 
attention of local police.  Traffic conditions are not factored in, nor are traffic flow 
control devices such as stop signs and stoplights.  It is assumed that these devices would 
have equal effect on all movers within the structure, and their effect should be marginal. 
An extension to the attacker shortest algorithm is coded to explore an expanded 
sample space.  A “penalized edge weighter” allows the Dijkstra algorithm to excessively 
penalize roads with speed categorizations above a fixed value.  This penalized weighter is 
used to explore an alternate solution space in which attackers would never prefer to take 
an expressway routing to their target.  The driving thought here is a proposal that 
highways may be screened by other fixed or re-deployable screening systems overtly in 
an effort to screen higher density traffic flows more thoroughly and deter their use by an 
attacker.  This would force any would-be attacker onto the “city streets.”  This 
employment strategy would force the attacker into a more vulnerable position with 
respect to mobile detectors with limited sensing radii and a preclusion for slower closing 
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velocities.  In the simulation, the majority of the highways and expressways that would 
be subject to penalization are geospatially coded as two opposing one-way highway 
segments due to excessive lane separation.  Resultantly, if they were not penalized, a 
detector who opposes an attacker on a highway segment would be unable to detect him 
on these divided, high-speed roads.   
A restatement of the implications of the penalized edge weighting system is as 
follows:  If the penalized weighting is NOT used, many attack routes will include lengthy 
segments of interstate or highway use by the attacker.  He will be essentially undetectable 
on the majority of these segments within the simulation due to geographic lane 
separation.  This is compatible with assumptions of detector design.  If the penalized 
weighter IS utilized, attackers will avoid the highway segments unless absolutely 
necessary (and if needed, will travel them at normal speed).  Searchers are unaffected by 
the penalized weighting and select all moves randomly. 
In summary, the model progresses in two distinct phases.  First, the dataset is 
processed from geo-specific locating data in the form of lat-long coordinates into a graph 
of node-arc format.  Additional administrative steps classify problem nodes, develop a 
starting node set, generate attack paths, and prepare the network for simulation use.  The 
DES engine then replicates numerous stochastic, independent attack replications using 
the graph and gathers statistical results.  A tiered pattern of Sim Event listeners enables a 
hierarchical control structure over the entities, and a mediator element monitors both 
attacker and searcher movements for interactions. 
Chapter III relates the independent variables to the control factors discussed.  
Additionally, the principal results are presented along with a detailed exploration of the 
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III. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The sample space of the model is parameterized by three factors:  the number of 
searchers configured; penalization of highway usage by attackers; and whether the 
searchers take periodic breaks or are in continuous motion.  Raw results across all 
configurations are presented along with a multiple logistic regression model and further 
analysis of the dynamics of the encounters catalogued over multiple runs. 
A. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
1. Underlying Goals 
The underlying reasoning for using a simulation on actual road networks was to 
capture the effects unique to a given large-scale roadway system.  In this regard the 
principal independent variable selection was the choice of city for the comparative study.  
Washington, D.C. was selected first and foremost because it is an obvious high value 
target that warrants additional protection measures and a layered defensive structure, but 
also because of its dynamic urban and suburban roadway structure that is characterized 
by rivers, bridges, express routes into the center of the city, and a well defined 
encompassing feature, the D.C. beltway. 
The principal question under investigation is a return on investment question for a 
procurement of mobile detectors.  Setting aside the engineering considerations and 
physics of detection, the core question is:  What probability of detection does a given 
number of mobile detectors yield?  Obvious follow-on questions of employment tactics, 
positioning, counter-countermeasures, and what to do when the “red light on the 
dashboard illuminates” quickly arise, but are all secondary to the need to know how often 
a detector-equipped vehicle might encounter an adversary. 
2. Factors 
The primary factor under evaluation is the number of searchers invoked.  
Searcher count is varied from over a range of 50 to 3000.  Fifty units represents a 
reasonable first investment in the technology, and although 3000 is well outside any 
expected appropriation for costing reasons, it is included simply to confirm simulation 
performance.  The principal range of investigation is 50 to 800 searchers.   
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Additionally, the effect of the searchers’ breaks at random intervals throughout 
the simulation is investigated to determine if the additional motion of the sensor package 
within the network produced by disabling breaks results in any incremental improvement 
of detection capability.  Recall that a searcher on break is simply motionless (parked) but 
retains the same scanning ability as a searcher in motion.  This may not fully capture true 
break dynamics in which the search vehicle may be in a parking lot and outside of 
sensing range of nearby threats (pessimistic scenario) or a searcher who positions his car 
on or near a median and is capable of sensing traffic in both directions (optimistic 
scenario); but should capture any benefit added by simple motion of the sensor. 
 The third factor under direct inspection is a variable controlling the speed 
penalty that is aimed at forcing the attacker off the expressways and onto city streets.  
When the penalty is enabled, roads with speed limit categories above a pre-defined 
threshold become grossly penalized when considered by the Dijkstra shortest path 
algorithm that specifies attack routes. 
B. PRINCIPLE RESULTS 
The probability of detection plotted against searcher count is summarized in 
Figure 8. The area encompassed in the AOR represents approximately 620 square miles 
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Figure 8. Detected Proportion vs. Number Searchers under various design settings 
 
Each data point represented in Figure 8 represents a 200 (simulated) hour run, 
which produces approximately 450 attacks with varying time duration of approximately 
20 minutes.  Design set points for each configuration of searchers, break taking (T/F), 
and penalized highway routing (T/F) were replicated three times with different random 
number seeding.  At the extreme level of sensor employment, multiple 3000-sensor runs 
were executed in two basic configurations as a validation of shaping assumptions.  The 
raw data suggests a nearly linear relationship between probability of detection and 
number of searchers employed over the small band of detection probabilities generated.  
It also suggests that penalizing the highways makes an increasingly large contribution to 
probability of detection over the span of number of searchers employed. 
Disallowing searcher breaks yields a slight, yet systematic increase in probability 
of intercept.  Data from comparable runs with 300 searchers is explored in Table 3.  
These data show an increase of 1.5% in probability of intercept when break-taking is 
disabled and searchers have more resultant motion in the graph.  The subsequent logistic 
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model reaffirms that break taking is a statistically significant factor in the overall logistic 






300 FALSE TRUE 50 465
300 FALSE TRUE 67 474
300 FALSE TRUE 55 467
172 1406 12.2%
300 FALSE FALSE 67 474
300 FALSE FALSE 65 477
300 FALSE FALSE 62 470
194 1421 13.7%
 
Table 3. Marginal Effect of Disabling Break-Taking. 
 
 
C. FITTING A LOGISTIC MODEL 
A logistic regression was fit to the model data to formalize the relationship of the 
three predictor variables; specifically, the number of searchers, penalization of the 
highways for attack runs, and whether the searchers take breaks.  Data used in the 
regression model encompassed searcher numbers from 50 to 800, which represents 
possible employment configurations, and encompasses over 29,500 simulated attack runs.  
Results are depicted in Figure 9.  Not surprisingly, the nearly linear relationship of 
detections to searcher count which spans this lower end of the probability of detection 





































































Figure 9. Logistic Regression with 3 factors:  Pd~(Number Searchers, Highway 
Penalization, Searcher Break Taking) 
 
Although break-taking as a factor is statistically significant, the reduced model 
without break-taking as a factor still is significant at a 99% confidence level, and is 
presented in Figure 10. Using the logistic formula generated by the full logistic 
regression, prediction curves are generated in Figures 11 and 12.  In both formulations, 
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Figure 11. Prediction curve for Pd as a function of Searchers, with highways NOT 
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Figure 12. Prediction curve for Pd as a function of Searchers, with highways penalized 
for attackers. 
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The nearly linear relationship between searchers employed and probability of 
detection over the observed range is not surprising, as the number of searchers employed 
has a nearly direct relationship with the number of street segments patrolled within these 
parameter ranges.  The number of potential searcher locations is the size of the edge set, 
200,487.  This is more than 250 times larger than the number of searchers employed at 
the highest setting, 800.  In configurations with this disparity in the magnitude of the ratio 
of searchers to searcher locations, nearly every searcher added directly translates into 
additional road segments screened with little duplication of effort. 
D. EFFECTS OF PENALIZING HIGHWAYS FOR ATTACKERS 
Highway penalization in attacker route selection produces systematically higher 
probabilities of intercept.  Again, exploring a characteristic configuration of 300 
searchers, a significant increase in intercept probability is noted in Table 4.  It must be re-
emphasized that this increase in probability of intercept is uniquely characteristic to the 
highway structure approaching the center of the selected target area; in this case, 
Washington, D.C.  It cannot be extrapolated to other urban target areas without a 
comparison of highway structures inside the attack radius which may provide rapid 
transit to the area of the target.  Consider, for example, a metropolitan area without 
expressway routes from the attack periphery into the target area.  In this scenario, 
highway penalization would be completely ineffectual, as there would be no highway 
segments on any of the shortest routes before penalization.  In the simulation conducted, 
highways labeled at or faster than Category 3 were penalized, and there are numerous 
expressways penetrating from the beltway inward that are effected.  [Category 3 in the 








300 TRUE TRUE 59 408
300 TRUE TRUE 68 411
300 TRUE TRUE 67 412
194 1231 15.8%
300 FALSE TRUE 50 465
300 FALSE TRUE 67 474
300 FALSE TRUE 55 467
172 1406 12.2%
 
Table 4. Effect of penalizing highways in  
attacker route selection. 
 
When considering an extended model in which arbitrations of intercepts may be 
conducted, it is appropriate to consider the closing velocity of the vehicles at intercept 
and the resultant dwell time provided the searcher.  A categorical look at the distribution 
of speed limits at the location of intercept is germane to this discussion.  By aggregating 
all detections made over all searcher counts (50-800) within the same break-taking 
configuration (breaks enabled), we can develop a more complete picture of the benefit to 
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Figure 13. Distribution of road speed categories for intercepts without penalized 
highways 
 
In comparing the aggregate number of detections depicted in Figure 13, we may 
wish to negate detections declared at relative closing speeds of greater than 80 m.p.h., 
which would represent a significant challenge to a mobile detector with current 
capabilities.  This would force the exclusion of all intercepts declared on road segments 
with speeds in excess of 40 m.p.h.  Reconsidering the aggregate data used to formulate 
the above comparison, a dramatic swing in effective detections declared occurs.  The 
penalized highway model now shows a more distinct advantage due to the accumulation 
of lower speed intercepts.  The shift in adjusted probability of detection over the 







Non-Penalized Highway Model 
Raw Aggregate Detections 928 (11.6% Pd) 
Excluded High Speed Detections 160 
Detections Declared 768 
Attacks Attempted 7970 
Adjusted Aggregate Probability of Intercept 9.64% 
 
Penalized Highway Model 
Raw Aggregate Detections 1053 (15.1% Pd) 
Excluded High Speed Detections 26 
Detections Declared 1027 
Attacks Attempted 6969 
Adjusted Aggregate Probability of Intercept 14.7% 
Table 5. Influence of excluding high-speed detections in both aggregated datasets 
 
 
E. REACTION TIME CONSIDERATIONS 
It is also desirable to generate possible reaction profiles from the data.  Reaction 
profiles in this sense are numerical measures of how far from the target the attacker is 
when the intercept occurs, and also how much time is remaining on his attack route.  
Distance to the target at intercept is measured as a straight line distance, and is of concern 
when considering the extended effects radius presented by WMD detonations or releases.  
Ideally, a credible defensive structure would be developed that provides detection at a 
distance that precludes an early detonation from inflicting damage in the primary target 
area, and affords the maximum reaction time for law enforcement services to react and 
interdict the attacker.  In the case of WMD threats, we should consider this safe distance 
in terms of miles from the target.  A detection and intercept that finds the target to be 
within the lethal radius of the intercepted weapon may reduce the net effect of the 
weapon, but is certainly not a successful intercept.   
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Additionally, it is desirable to know how much time is remaining on the attacker’s 
route when he is encountered.  This time remaining translates into reaction time by law 
enforcement agencies.  Ideally, a sensing agent would be able to reverse course in traffic 
and intercept the vehicle on-the-spot, but it is more likely the case that some additional 
effort in the form of a reaction team, secondary confirmation, target 
identification/confirmation maneuvering, or pursuit may be involved.  It should be 
emphasized that any route timing generated by this simulation is an overly optimistic 
estimation of true road travel time.  The simulation does not include traffic factors, nor 
does it factor in traffic control devices.  Essentially, the route time generated reflects a 
speed-limit drive with green lights all the way. 
Intuitively, straight line distance (SLD) and time to go (TTG) will both increase 
with number of searchers deployed, given that an intercept occurs.  The data supports 
this, however the distribution of both within the attack radius is quite random, and only 
mildly influenced by increases in searcher numbers. 
 

























Figure 14. Straight Line Distance (SLD)  to target at time of encounter for runs with 
highways penalized and no searcher breaks.  Noise in low-searcher runs is driven by 
significantly lower overall intercepts in those configurations. 
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Figure 15. Time To Go (TTG) to target at time of encounter for same dataset. 
 
In both of the reaction profile graphs above, the standard deviation of the data is 
on the order of half of the maximal, characteristic value for the response profiled, which 
is indicative of the extreme variability of the response.  Specifically, the maximum SLD 
is approximately 10 miles, based on the geographically filtered start node set.  The 
deviance in the SLD profile hovers around 4.0, indicating that predictions will vary 
wildly between zero and the maximal value of 10.0.  A similar comparison can be drawn 
with the TTG profile, which carries a maximal value near 0.25 hours.  The data 
represented in the SLD and TTG graphs is reproduced in Table 6.  Each data point 
plotted in Figures 15 and 16 represents a run of fixed duration.  Thus, configurations with 
fewer searchers will have lower accumulated intercepts and will show more dispersion.  










Intercepts avg(SLD) sd(SLD) avg(TTG) sd(TTG)
[miles] [miles] [hours] [hours]
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 375 14 5.462 3.561 0.175 0.107
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 375 14 6.239 3.850 0.212 0.131
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 379 13 6.345 4.141 0.208 0.131
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 371 26 6.719 3.342 0.222 0.107
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 365 27 4.022 3.756 0.136 0.120
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 362 28 5.615 2.688 0.191 0.078
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 350 55 6.251 4.101 0.196 0.120
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 357 48 6.347 3.617 0.206 0.112
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 349 61 6.425 3.897 0.207 0.118
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 349 67 6.242 3.968 0.202 0.117
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 333 78 5.069 3.613 0.167 0.112
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 338 75 5.299 3.833 0.170 0.117
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 318 104 5.161 3.789 0.171 0.115
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 331 91 5.734 3.881 0.190 0.123
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 329 97 6.325 4.064 0.202 0.124
DC 800 TRUE FALSE 274 201 6.427 3.741 0.203 0.112
DC 800 TRUE FALSE 275 199 6.504 3.730 0.214 0.118
Grand Averages: 5.893 0.193  
Table 6. Reference data subset used for analysis of SLD and TTG 
 
In general, the raw data suggest a nearly linear relationship between searchers 
employed and probability of detection generated in the band of searcher numbers 
explored.  In the Washington D. C. area, penalizing highways within the beltway is a 
significant benefit to the searcher’s efforts.  Not only are more encounters produced, but a 
dramatic shift towards slower speed intercepts is recognized.  Implications of these 
findings are more thoroughly developed in Chapter IV. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DETECTION MODEL 
The overarching goal of this simulation development was to produce an 
effectiveness model for limited range mobile detectors applied in urban traffic schemes.  
This model shows that if no other means were used to augment the performance of 
randomly moving sensors that at least 150 sensors are required to generate a probability 
of detection greater than roughly 10% in the greater Washington D. C. area.  This may 
seem like a paltry contribution from 150 advanced detectors, however, it must be realized 
that this baseline model only represents one mode of sensor employment, and presents 
fairly simple options for radically increasing performance.  The low probability of 
detection generated by the simulation is principally the byproduct of three factors: 
1. High ratio of potential attack routes to number of interdicting arcs patrolled. 
2. Extremely limited detection range. 
3. Sub-optimal searcher employment scheme in this base-case. 
 
Before exploring possible performance enhancements to the search model, it 
should be noted that even fairly low probabilities of detection can serve as a significant 
deterrence factor or as a preventive measure inside a layered defensive structure.  While a 
10-20 percent chance of detection is ineffective in the face of repeated attacks or low-cost 
efforts on the part of the attacker, it does represent a significant deterrent to extraordinary 
and singular attempts by an attacker with limited capabilities.  An attacking agent that is 
clearly exposed to huge risk and has devoted years of effort and finance to a singular 
WMD attack would likely find it difficult to reconcile with a 1-in-10 chance of failure in 
these efforts.  Additionally, as mentioned in the description of layered security, the 
relatively small independent contribution from a detector scheme described herein adds 
significant power to a layered model through the power of accumulated probability of 
detection generated by the compounding effect of joint probabilities.  Additionally, some 
means of detection and intervention must be preserved in any defensive system to counter 
a threat warning from within the territorial borders, for a suspected breach at a border  
 
40 
entry point, or from a reliable, actionable item of domestic intelligence.  Mobile detectors 
bring tremendous flexibility and adaptability to possible reaction schemes in these 
scenarios. 
If we decide that screening effort within a major metropolitan area is necessary, 
mobile detectors become a front-running option.  As mentioned previously, static 
defensive structures, especially when dispersed across large geographic areas can be 
observed, probed, and likely defeated by an adversary who is patient enough to wait for 
or produce a window opportunity.  Inspecting the huge volume of vehicles entering or 
leaving a major metropolitan area has very low chance of serving as an adequate 
secondary measure.  It is unsustainable, and easily recognized and countered or waited 
out.  Mobile detector employment has been proposed and various performance 
enhancements will subsequently be presented. 
B. MORE OPTIMIZED EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES 
1. Smart Patrolling Patterns 
The search patterns generated within the model are completely random, and 
although they serve as an effective base case, they do not represent savvy police work.  
Clearly, beats are established and higher profile areas defined by traffic density or crime 
statistics receive more attention than farm roads in suburbs outside the beltway.  A 
reapportioning of searchers within beats would likely make a marked difference, along 
with emphasizing the patrol of arcs that are included in possible paths from outside the 
protected zone, as opposed to “drilling into” subsets of the graph that are not functionally 
part of any possible attack path.  This would likely diminish the chances of detecting a 
rogue attack initiated from a location within the protected zone, but would provide 
dividends in increasing chances of detection for attacks initiated outside of the protected 
zone. 
2. Cut Set Screening 
If we consider a cut set of arcs on the graph to be smartly generated from street 
segments at an approximate fixed radial distance from the target area, we can manage 
screening on those arcs to produce large performance gains.  In this scheme, cut sets are 
developed at radii from the target that balance the size of the cut set with the distance and 
time-to-go generated by a detection at that range.  For example, a close inspection of the 
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map structure may reveal that a reduced road density at a radius of approximately 7 miles 
from the target would produce a cut set size of 400 streets, and would generate an 
average reaction time of 20 minutes with 7 miles of distance from the target.  [These 
numbers are hypothetical and are not implied to represent the D.C. dataset].  Stationary 
detector vehicles parked on arcs in this set would provide a ring of security with 
performance proportional to the ratio of arcs scanned.  Covert deployment of the sensors 
in this case (via unmarked screening vehicles) would be an obvious step towards 
thwarting countermeasures.  This implementation has additional benefits in reduced 
manpower requirements, as many vehicles could be parked unattended while nearby 
responders could act on linked threat information.  This scheme has a better chance of 
stabilizing the SLD and TTG at detection times to a range actionable by response 
vehicles. 
C. COUNTERMEASURES AND COUNTER-COUNTERMEASURES 
Any robust attacker-defender model must take into consideration likely 
countermeasures by both sides.  Certainly, an attacker who is aware of a detection and 
screening program will seek to improve the chances of success of a singular attack.  
WMD is not a game of long-run odds where the power of repetition can be invoked.  
Singular attacks will likely involve various contingency plans and at least modest 
countermeasures.  The countermeasures chosen by the attacker will likely produce 
additional actions on the part of the defender.  Contemporary examples of this behavior 
are found in electronic warfare in the form of radar jamming and counter-jamming radar 
waveforms, or in heat-seeking air-to-air missiles which frequently have guidance logic 
that specifically counters the flares meant to decoy them. 
On initial inspection, various countermeasures on the part of the attacker are 
readily evident.  A simple pilot-vehicle implementation has the potential to significantly 
reduce the already unlikely chance of an encounter with a searcher.  In this scenario, a 
pilot or lead vehicle is employed to maneuver a few blocks ahead of the actual attack 
vehicle.  Upon recognition of a sensor equipped vehicle (presumably a police cruiser), the 




the subsequent encounter with the patrol vehicle.  Certainly, this could be countered with 
unmarked patrol vehicles, but at a likely cost of requiring additional vehicles and 
personnel on the roadways. 
A second, devious, yet sadly plausible countermeasure involves a large-scale 
diversionary event.  An event such as a large conventional explosive detonation in an 
opposing approach quadrant would likely divert many of the patrol assets away from the 
true attack path, allowing an attack vehicle a relatively uncontested entry into the primary 
target zone.  Both of these relatively simplistic countermeasures need to be met with 
disciplined and methodical counter-countermeasures (CCM).  Such CCM may involve 
increase use of dedicated, unmarked detection vehicles, many of which may be statically 
employed without additional personnel demands. 
D. MODEL EXTENSIONS 
The alternative, more optimized employment means delineated in this chapter 
already suggest viable extensions to the simulation model employed.  The framework of 
the program would allow, with minor modification, the assignment of beats or patrols to 
the searchers to produce a more optimized patrol pattern.  Additional structuring would 
be required to support an exploration of dynamically patrolling cut sets with patrol 
vehicles during the simulation run, but a well-defined low-count cut set derived by 
external map study could provide the framework of a first cut solution within the 
simulation.  A selection of arcs (streets) from within this externally generated set could 
be flagged in the dataset in the simulation and used to generate statistical performance 
results. 
Additional unique utilizations of mobile detectors also warrant further study.  
Suppose, for instance, a threat is levied against a particular target, the Capitol building, as 
an example.  Mobile detectors could be used to screen and scan all parked vehicles within 
a critical defensive ring around this structure.  The implementation would look something 
like a multiple-agent traveling salesman problem in which all streets (and parking 
structures) within a certain critical radius need to be swept by a slow-moving detector in 
order to clear the area.  The time required to perform such a sweep would be a function of 
the number of sensors employed, routing decisions, and summary length of paths 
encircled. 
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Further exploration should also include response and intercept simulation.  
Currently, in this simplified model, encounter implies detection and detection implies 
intercept.  Modeling of the detection physics for a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack 
is beyond the classification scope of an open simulation model, but reaction in traffic and 
any subsequent group behavior by the searcher “battalion” could be openly developed.  
For example, suppose a detection is declared in traffic.  It is likely in city traffic that 
discriminating the vehicle which triggered the alert from the rest will require additional 
screening effort.  The secondary screening might be produced by a rapid set of actions by 
the detecting unit (U-turn and pursuit for example), or by a coordinated response by other 
detection equipped vehicles.  This secondary, confirmation reading should occur 
somewhere between the point of initial alert and the likely target area.  The response by 
other agents and the resultant timeliness of the effort to interdict traffic flow and 
implement confirmation screening is directly linked to the probability of successful 
interdiction. 
In summary, the cumulative deterrent and detection benefits of a layered 
defensive structure are clear.  While low-deployment densities of mobile detecting agents 
do not generate large independent detection probabilities when employed in random 
search, the study does suggest that modest employment densities provide a very credible 
addition to the layered security model.  Additionally, mobile detectors enable flexibility 
in response options and inject a largely stochastic patrol element into what is currently a 
static, observable, and vulnerable screening system.  Additionally, as funds may become 
focused in this area, or as technology and production advances allow, deployment of 
sensors may become ubiquitous, in which case the power of the detection model becomes 
greatly magnified.  It is not inconceivable that modest advances in detection hardware 
could facilitate small, linked, localizable, sensors mountable on all government and city 
vehicles, or even expand deployment to include citizenry who receive modest 
compensation for the government-owned black box they volunteer to have mounted in 
their vehicle’s trunk.  It must be restated that attacks that can produce unthinkable 
damage and loss must be met with highly creative and adaptive defensive measures.  
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V. APPENDIX A.:  MAIN EXECUTABLE 
The following code segment is provided as an example of the Java code 
structuring using simulation entities designed in SimKit.  Additional classes do the 






































 * The main executable to run the simulation. It is set to use command line 
 * arguments to set variables. Output can be either piped to System.out or  
 * logged in a file based on command line settings. 
 *  
 * @version $Id: SimExecable.java,v 1.16 2007/02/12 19:26:25 jfhyink Exp $ 
 * @author J. F. Hyink 
 *  
 */ 
public class SimExecable extends SimEntityBase { 
 
 @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") 
 public static void main(String[] args) { 
 
  // ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
  // 
  //                     Variables 
  // 
  // ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
  // simulation entities 
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  GraphManager manager; 
  Graph graph; 
  WeightedEdgeMap edgeMap; 
  AttackInstigator instigator; 
  SearchLeader leader; 
  RandomSearchManager[] searchMoverManager; 
  BasicGraphMover[] searchMover; 
  Searcher[] searcher; 
  BasicInterceptMediator mediator; 
 
  // i/o variables 
  String cityName = null; 
  String targetFeatureID = null; 
  String searcherBaseFeatureID = null; 
  String datafileName = null; 
  URL sourceURL; 
  boolean pipeOut = true; // if pipeOut is true, output will be sent to 
        // screen, else it will be logged 
  String outputFilename = null; 
 
  // per-run variables 
  int speedPenaltyCutoffIndex = 999; 
  int numSearchers = 0; 
  boolean takesBreaks = true; 
  long seed = 0; 
 
  // simulation visualization variables 
  boolean startSetVisible = false; 
  boolean runtimeVisible = false; 
  boolean pathsAtCompletionVisible = false; 
 
  // text output modes 
  boolean consoleSugar = false; 
  boolean verbose = false; 
 
  // plotters and viewers 
  CheapViewer viewer = null; 
  PathPlotter plotter = null; 
 
  double runLength = 0.0; // hours of simulated time (set in input file) 
 
  // pull the input file and variables from command line args 
  if (args.length < 15) { 
   System.err 
     .println("expecting args in long form (see instructions)"); 
   System.err 
     .println("dfile, name, tgt, base, rtime, srchrs, " +  
       "spdCutoff, tbreaks, seed, cSugar, vrbse, "+  
       "startVis, runVis, pathVis, pipeOut"); 
   System.exit(-1); 
  } else { 
   datafileName = args[0]; 
   cityName = args[1]; 
   targetFeatureID = args[2]; 
   searcherBaseFeatureID = args[3]; 
   runLength = (new Double(args[4])).doubleValue(); 
   numSearchers = (new Integer(args[5])).intValue(); 
   speedPenaltyCutoffIndex = (new Integer(args[6])).intValue(); 
   takesBreaks = (args[7].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   seed = Long.parseLong(args[8]); 
   consoleSugar = (args[9].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   verbose = (args[10].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   startSetVisible = (args[11].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   runtimeVisible = (args[12].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   pathsAtCompletionVisible = (args[13].charAt(0) == 't') ? true 
     : false; 
   pipeOut = (args[14].charAt(0) == 't') ? true : false; 
   if (args.length > 15) 
    outputFilename = args[15]; 
  } 
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  // ****************************** 
  // Set the seed of the RandomVariateFactory 
  // ****************************** 
 
  RandomVariateFactory.getDefaultRandomNumber().setSeed(seed); 
 
  // load a shapefile into data storage 
  InputHandler handler = new InputHandler(); 
  String[] source; 
  source = new String[] { datafileName }; 
  sourceURL = handler.getURLtoFile(source); 
 
  // this "makes" the graph 
  manager = new GraphManager(sourceURL, speedPenaltyCutoffIndex); 
  manager.setVerbose(verbose); 
  edgeMap = manager.getEdgeMap(); 
  graph = manager.getFGG().getGraph(); 
 
  // build check: 
  int edges = graph.getEdges().size(); 
  if (consoleSugar) 
   System.err.println("\nedges in graph constructed: " + edges); 
 
  // show the map at build-time if visible is set 
  if (startSetVisible) { 
   viewer = new CheapViewer(manager.getCRS()); 
   viewer.showCollection(manager.getFeatureCollection(), 
     CheapViewer.GRAY); 
   // viewer.pauseForReturn(); 
  } 
 
  // set up a PathTool utility used for routing and reaching stuff 
  PathTool pathTool = new PathTool(edgeMap, graph); 
 
  // anchor the homeBase and target Features 
  BasicDirectedNode homeNode = null, targetNode = null; 
  targetNode = (BasicDirectedNode) manager.getEdge(targetFeatureID) 
    .getOutNode(); 
  homeNode = (BasicDirectedNode) manager.getEdge(searcherBaseFeatureID) 
    .getOutNode(); 
 
  // show reaching stats on graph built (principally for QA/error 
  // checking) 
  int unreachableSetSize = Reaching.unreachableNodes(graph, homeNode) 
    .size(); 
  int isolatedSetSize = Reaching.isolatedNodes(graph, homeNode).size(); 
  if (consoleSugar) { 
   System.err.println("Unreachable set size: " + unreachableSetSize); 
   System.err.println("Isolated set size: " + isolatedSetSize); 
  } 
 
  // ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
  // 
  // find legitimate starting nodes for attack based on intersections 
  // with a circle that fits within the boundaries of the map 
  // 
  // ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
 
  FeatureCollection starters = null; 
  ArrayList<Feature> startingFeatures = new ArrayList<Feature>(); 
  HashSet<BasicDirectedNode> startingNodes = null; 
 
  // find starting nodes graphically 
  Coordinate center = null; 
  center = manager.getFeatureCollection().getBounds().centre(); 
  double maxWidth = manager.getFeatureCollection().getBounds().getWidth(); 
  double maxHeight = manager.getFeatureCollection().getBounds() 
    .getHeight(); 
  double minDemension = (maxWidth < maxHeight) ? maxWidth : maxHeight; 
  // 95% of minimum dimension's half-width for radius 
  double attackRadius = minDemension * (0.5) * (0.95); 
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  try { 
   starters = manager.getFeaturesAtRadius(center, attackRadius); 
   startingFeatures.addAll(starters); 
   startingNodes = manager.getInNodesFromFeatures(startingFeatures); 
   if (consoleSugar) { 
    System.err.println("Attack node start points generated: " 
      + startingNodes.size()); 
   } 
   if (startSetVisible) { 
    viewer.addLayerOnTop(starters, CheapViewer.RED); 
    if (consoleSugar) 
     System.err.println("hit return to continue run."); 
    viewer.pauseForReturn(); 
 
   } 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 
  // ******************************************** 
  // set up remaining standing entities 
  // ******************************************** 
 
  InterceptReportFactory interceptReportFactory =  
   new InterceptReportFactory(manager, pathTool); 
  mediator = new BasicInterceptMediator(manager, interceptReportFactory); 
  mediator.setVisual(runtimeVisible); 
  mediator.setVerbose(verbose); 
  leader = new SearchLeader(graph); 
  instigator = new AttackInstigator(startingNodes, targetNode, graph, 
    edgeMap, mediator); 
  instigator.setConsoleSugar(consoleSugar); 
 
  // enable the attackInstigator to create penalized routes if flag 
  // (999) is NOT set 
  if (speedPenaltyCutoffIndex != 999) { 
   instigator.setPenaltyMap(manager.getPenaltyMap()); 
  } else { // turn it off 
   instigator.setUsePenaltyMap(false); 
  } 
 
  // ******************************************* 
  // set up listeners for standing entities 
  // ******************************************* 
 
  // this will allow the instigator to "scramble" the searchers 
  instigator.addSimEventListener(leader); 
 
  // set up RandomVariates 
  RandomVariate breakDuration = RandomVariateFactory.getInstance( 
    "Uniform", new Object[] { new Double(0.2), new Double(1.0) }); 
  RandomVariate timeBetweenBreaks = RandomVariateFactory.getInstance( 
    "Uniform", new Object[] { new Double(0.5), new Double(1.0) }); 
  double proportionOnBreakAtStart = 0.55; 
 
  // ********************* 
  // set up a logger 
  // ********************* 
 
  FileWriter w = null; 
  if (!pipeOut) { // if w is left null, logger will instantiate to got to 
      // System.out 
   try { 
    w = new FileWriter(outputFilename); 
   } catch (IOException e) { 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
  BasicLogger logger = new BasicLogger(w, manager); 
  // logger hears reports from report factory and the instigator 
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  interceptReportFactory.addPropertyChangeListener(logger); 
  instigator.addPropertyChangeListener(logger); 
 
  // ********************* 
  // set up a path plotter if visible is set 
  // ********************* 
  if (pathsAtCompletionVisible) { 
   plotter = new PathPlotter(manager); 
   mediator.addPropertyChangeListener(plotter); 
   instigator.addPropertyChangeListener(plotter); 
  } 
 
  // ************************** 
  // set up the run 
  // ************************** 
 
  // initialize the appropriate number of searchers 
  int searchers = numSearchers; 
  searcher = new Searcher[searchers]; 
  searchMover = new BasicGraphMover[searchers]; 
  searchMoverManager = new RandomSearchManager[searchers]; 
 
  // initialize movers and searchers 
  for (int i = 0; i < searchers; i++) { 
   searcher[i] = new Searcher("serno " + i); 
   searchMover[i] = new BasicGraphMover(searcher[i], edgeMap); 
   searchMoverManager[i] = new RandomSearchManager(manager.getFGG() 
     .getGraph(), homeNode, pathTool); 
 
   searchMoverManager[i].setupBreaks(timeBetweenBreaks, breakDuration, 
     proportionOnBreakAtStart); 
   searchMoverManager[i].setTakesBreaks(takesBreaks); 
   searchMoverManager[i].setUTurnMaker(false); 
 
   // set up listeners for search entities 
   searchMover[i].addSimEventListener(searchMoverManager[i]); 
   searchMoverManager[i].addSimEventListener(searchMover[i]); 
 
   // connect to searchLeader 
   leader.addSimEventListener(searchMoverManager[i]); 
   searchMoverManager[i].addSimEventListener(leader); 
 
   // connect mover to mediator 
   searchMover[i].addSimEventListener(mediator); 
   mediator.addSimEventListener(searchMover[i]); 
  } 
 
  // send the run variables to the logger 
  logger.setCityName(cityName); 
  logger.setSearchersUsed(searchers); 
  logger.setTakesBreaks(takesBreaks); 
  if (speedPenaltyCutoffIndex != 999) 
   logger.setPenalizedHighways(true); 
  else 
   logger.setPenalizedHighways(false); 
 
  Schedule.reset(); 
  Schedule.stopAtTime(runLength); 
  Schedule.setVerbose(verbose); 
  Schedule.setReallyVerbose(false); 
  Schedule.startSimulation(); 
 
  // log results 
  logger.endRun(); 
  if (consoleSugar) { 
   System.err.println( 
     "\n\t**********" +  
     "\n\t*        *" +  
     "\n\t*  DONE  *" +  
     "\n\t*        *" +  
     "\n\t**********"); 
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  } 
 
  // **************** 
  // summary jobs 
  // **************** 
 
  if (runtimeVisible) { 
   // kill the realtime viewer 
   viewer.getFrame().dispose(); 
  } 
 
  if (consoleSugar) {// show the number of isolated entries for QA 
   int isoEntries = 0; 
   for (int i = 0; i < searchMoverManager.length; i++) { 
    isoEntries += searchMoverManager[i].getNumEntriesToIsolated(); 
   } 
   System.err.println("Number of entries to isolated areas " + 
     "requiring reset: " + isoEntries); 
  } 
 
  if (verbose) {// show the interceps on the console 
   HashSet<InterceptReport> reportSet = new HashSet<InterceptReport>(); 
   reportSet.addAll(mediator.getReports()); 
   Iterator<InterceptReport> i = reportSet.iterator(); 
   System.out 
    .println("\n ****************** intercepts******************" 
       + "\n total intercepts: " + reportSet.size()); 
   int count = 0; 
   double cumulativeDist = 0.0; 
   while (i.hasNext()) { 
    InterceptReport current = i.next(); 
    System.out.println("\n**** intercept report: " + ++count); 
    System.out.println(current); 
    cumulativeDist += current.getSlantRangeToTarget(); 
   } 
   System.out.println("average intercept range: " + cumulativeDist 
     / count); 
  } 
 
  if (pathsAtCompletionVisible) { 
   if (PathPlotter.isRunning()) { 
    PathPlotter.getViewer().showCollection( 
      manager.getFeatureCollection(), CheapViewer.GRAY); 
    plotter.showSuccessfulAttacks(); 
    plotter.showInterceptedAttacks(); 
    PathPlotter.refresh(); 
   } 
  } 
  // *********************** 
  // cleanup 
  // *********************** 
 
  // kill the open writer thread in the logger 
  try { 
   if (!pipeOut) 
    logger.getWriter().close(); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
 
 protected static double convertStatuteMilesToDegrees(double statuteMiles) { 
  double nauticalMiles = statuteMiles * 1.15077945; 
  double degrees = nauticalMiles / 60.0; 






VI. APPENDIX B.:  RAW DATA 
The data used for analysis is presented below.  Each row represents a run of 200 
simulated hours at the given set point.  Various runs were executed with 3000 searchers 
employed.  This number of searchers is well outside the normal bandwidth of 
employment options (0 – 800), and the results were excluded from the logistic model and 
analysis. 
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Intercepts p(S.Attk) p(S.Intcpt) avSLD sdSLD avTTG sdTTG cat 1 cat 2 cat 3 cat 4 cat 5 cat 6 cat 7 cat 8
DC 50 FALSE TRUE 437 15 0.967 0.033 4.681 4.355 0.137 0.122 0 2 0 2 4 7 0 0
DC 50 FALSE TRUE 441 9 0.980 0.020 4.580 2.751 0.152 0.079 0 1 0 0 2 6 0 0
DC 50 FALSE TRUE 440 12 0.973 0.027 5.616 4.692 0.173 0.140 0 1 0 0 3 8 0 0
DC 100 FALSE TRUE 434 12 0.973 0.027 5.426 3.961 0.192 0.136 0 0 0 0 6 6 0 0
DC 100 FALSE TRUE 437 20 0.956 0.044 5.183 4.571 0.171 0.141 0 1 0 0 6 13 0 0
DC 100 FALSE TRUE 434 26 0.943 0.057 5.812 3.835 0.166 0.108 0 6 0 0 14 6 0 0
DC 200 FALSE TRUE 422 49 0.896 0.104 5.254 3.650 0.163 0.107 0 6 0 2 18 23 0 0
DC 200 FALSE TRUE 418 49 0.895 0.105 5.025 3.349 0.154 0.095 0 9 0 0 17 23 0 0
DC 200 FALSE TRUE 422 47 0.900 0.100 5.388 4.287 0.167 0.130 0 5 0 1 13 28 0 0
DC 300 FALSE TRUE 415 50 0.892 0.108 5.583 4.386 0.166 0.137 0 8 0 3 15 24 0 0
DC 300 FALSE TRUE 407 67 0.859 0.141 5.955 3.739 0.191 0.117 0 7 1 2 26 31 0 0
DC 300 FALSE TRUE 412 55 0.882 0.118 5.214 4.116 0.159 0.124 0 7 0 1 19 28 0 0
DC 400 FALSE TRUE 392 90 0.813 0.187 5.890 3.958 0.178 0.121 0 13 1 3 37 36 0 0
DC 400 FALSE TRUE 394 84 0.824 0.176 5.227 3.957 0.165 0.122 0 9 0 3 33 39 0 0
DC 400 FALSE TRUE 407 66 0.860 0.140 5.283 3.445 0.165 0.103 0 10 0 0 22 34 0 0
DC 800 FALSE TRUE 363 146 0.713 0.287 5.602 3.932 0.163 0.113 0 29 1 3 58 55 0 0
DC 800 FALSE TRUE 367 131 0.737 0.263 5.476 4.021 0.170 0.124 0 19 0 4 47 60 1 0
DC 50 TRUE TRUE 372 15 0.961 0.039 3.265 3.458 0.118 0.116 0 0 0 1 2 12 0 0
DC 50 TRUE TRUE 374 13 0.966 0.034 5.502 4.283 0.189 0.146 0 0 0 0 4 8 1 0
DC 50 TRUE TRUE 378 8 0.979 0.021 6.145 4.877 0.180 0.126 0 0 0 0 7 1 0 0
DC 100 TRUE TRUE 375 22 0.945 0.055 6.629 3.973 0.216 0.129 0 0 0 0 10 12 0 0
DC 100 TRUE TRUE 371 22 0.944 0.056 6.500 3.988 0.201 0.114 0 0 0 0 12 10 0 0
DC 100 TRUE TRUE 367 25 0.936 0.064 6.547 3.665 0.203 0.101 0 0 0 0 11 14 0 0
DC 200 TRUE TRUE 350 56 0.862 0.138 6.064 3.812 0.189 0.109 0 0 0 1 33 21 1 0
DC 200 TRUE TRUE 362 47 0.885 0.115 6.465 3.623 0.200 0.104 0 0 0 2 22 23 0 0
DC 200 TRUE TRUE 360 42 0.896 0.104 5.829 3.227 0.179 0.087 0 0 0 2 16 24 0 0
DC 300 TRUE TRUE 349 59 0.855 0.145 5.994 3.875 0.184 0.117 0 0 0 1 32 26 0 0
DC 300 TRUE TRUE 343 68 0.835 0.165 6.262 3.882 0.207 0.123 0 0 0 0 40 28 0 0
DC 300 TRUE TRUE 345 67 0.837 0.163 5.860 3.920 0.180 0.110 0 0 0 2 26 39 0 0
DC 400 TRUE TRUE 327 92 0.780 0.220 6.101 3.892 0.205 0.123 0 0 0 0 43 49 0 0
DC 400 TRUE TRUE 335 81 0.805 0.195 5.266 3.896 0.165 0.110 0 0 0 2 37 42 0 0
DC 400 TRUE TRUE 328 101 0.765 0.235 6.359 3.969 0.206 0.124 0 0 0 3 42 55 1 0
DC 800 TRUE TRUE 286 170 0.627 0.373 6.271 3.879 0.199 0.115 0 0 0 5 87 78 0 0
DC 800 TRUE TRUE 294 165 0.641 0.359 6.232 3.813 0.198 0.113 0 0 0 7 75 82 1 0
DC 50 FALSE FALSE 432 21 0.954 0.046 6.867 3.922 0.212 0.122 0 3 0 0 10 8 0 0
DC 50 FALSE FALSE 440 8 0.982 0.018 7.258 3.224 0.229 0.118 0 2 0 0 4 2 0 0
DC 50 FALSE FALSE 438 8 0.982 0.018 4.491 3.944 0.134 0.131 0 2 0 0 2 4 0 0
DC 100 FALSE FALSE 435 23 0.950 0.050 4.905 3.758 0.159 0.116 0 2 0 0 9 12 0 0
DC 100 FALSE FALSE 434 26 0.943 0.057 6.515 4.123 0.200 0.134 0 5 0 1 8 12 0 0
DC 100 FALSE FALSE 429 23 0.949 0.051 4.719 3.586 0.135 0.094 0 6 0 0 7 10 0 0
DC 200 FALSE FALSE 413 56 0.881 0.119 5.020 4.163 0.167 0.133 0 3 0 1 20 32 0 0
DC 200 FALSE FALSE 423 43 0.908 0.092 4.896 3.499 0.160 0.112 0 3 0 0 17 23 0 0
DC 300 FALSE FALSE 407 67 0.859 0.141 6.280 3.979 0.197 0.121 0 5 0 3 24 35 0 0
DC 300 FALSE FALSE 412 65 0.864 0.136 6.100 4.235 0.186 0.140 0 17 0 0 24 23 1 0
DC 300 FALSE FALSE 408 62 0.868 0.132 6.400 4.021 0.200 0.122 0 6 0 1 31 24 0 0
DC 400 FALSE FALSE 390 94 0.806 0.194 5.704 3.831 0.180 0.117 0 10 0 1 32 51 0 0
DC 400 FALSE FALSE 395 90 0.814 0.186 6.044 4.089 0.186 0.126 0 11 0 1 39 38 1 0
DC 400 FALSE FALSE 397 91 0.814 0.186 5.218 4.053 0.163 0.127 0 16 0 2 28 45 0 0
DC 800 FALSE FALSE 346 165 0.677 0.323 5.408 4.039 0.168 0.122 0 21 0 1 59 83 1 0
DC 800 FALSE FALSE 340 173 0.663 0.337 5.914 3.829 0.181 0.115 0 30 0 7 61 74 1 0
DC 3000 FALSE FALSE 188 482 0.281 0.719 6.908 4.153 0.208 0.127 0 73 0 12 210 181 6 0
DC 3000 FALSE FALSE 206 445 0.316 0.684 6.952 4.181 0.213 0.130 0 63 0 9 198 170 5 0
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 375 14 0.964 0.036 5.462 3.561 0.175 0.107 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 0
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 375 14 0.964 0.036 6.239 3.850 0.212 0.131 0 0 0 0 7 7 0 0
DC 50 TRUE FALSE 379 13 0.967 0.033 6.345 4.141 0.208 0.131 0 0 0 0 9 4 0 0
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 371 26 0.935 0.065 6.719 3.342 0.222 0.107 0 0 0 0 13 13 0 0
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 365 27 0.931 0.069 4.022 3.756 0.136 0.120 0 0 0 1 9 17 0 0
DC 100 TRUE FALSE 362 28 0.928 0.072 5.615 2.688 0.191 0.078 0 0 0 0 11 17 0 0
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 350 55 0.864 0.136 6.251 4.101 0.196 0.120 0 0 0 3 25 27 0 0
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 357 48 0.881 0.119 6.347 3.617 0.206 0.112 0 0 0 1 27 20 0 0
DC 200 TRUE FALSE 349 61 0.851 0.149 6.425 3.897 0.207 0.118 0 0 0 2 25 34 0 0
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 349 67 0.839 0.161 6.242 3.968 0.202 0.117 0 0 0 3 23 41 0 0
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 333 78 0.810 0.190 5.069 3.613 0.167 0.112 0 0 0 1 35 42 0 0
DC 300 TRUE FALSE 338 75 0.818 0.182 5.299 3.833 0.170 0.117 0 0 0 5 34 36 0 0
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 318 104 0.754 0.246 5.161 3.789 0.171 0.115 0 0 0 2 42 60 0 0
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 331 91 0.784 0.216 5.734 3.881 0.190 0.123 0 0 0 3 42 46 0 0
DC 400 TRUE FALSE 329 97 0.772 0.228 6.325 4.064 0.202 0.124 0 0 0 1 35 61 0 0
DC 800 TRUE FALSE 274 201 0.577 0.423 6.427 3.741 0.203 0.112 0 0 0 1 92 108 0 0
DC 800 TRUE FALSE 275 199 0.580 0.420 6.504 3.730 0.214 0.118 0 0 0 3 88 107 1 0
DC 3000 TRUE FALSE 117 571 0.170 0.830 7.572 3.822 0.239 0.119 0 0 0 13 305 250 3 0
DC 3000 TRUE FALSE 131 533 0.197 0.803 7.417 3.737 0.236 0.117 0 0 0 11 297 224 1 0
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